GEOPOLITICS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
An analysis of the recent high level visit by China to New Zealand with some connections with what’s going on between China and the Philippines and something more…
If all west nations were like New Zealand.
This could be the wishful thinking that, at the moment, the senior bureaucrats at the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be tempted to contemplate with.
Not that New Zealand also officially known as Aotearoa with its geographical location enmeshed in the Pacific Ocean and its proud Māori’ history and traditions that, over the decades, have been mainstreamed in the nation’s fabric, can be exactly considered the “traditional” west.
Yet considering the productive visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Wellington last week, Wellington remains an ideal partner for Beijing.
It is not that everything works perfectly but, relatively with what is unfolding these days in Manila, the bond and understanding between China and New Zealand, is certainly assuring.
As ably described by Geoffrey Miller for the Democracy Project, the Chinese’s engagement with New Zealand comes amid speculations that the new right lining government in Wellington might be considering the less lethal but certainly not less strategic Pillar II of Aukus, the defensive agreement that links Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA.
Not only Prime Minister Luxon of New Zealand affirmed this possibility last December while meeting his Australian counterpart but also the early February “2+2” foreign and defense ministers meeting between Australia and New Zealand revamped the idea.
The idea of New Zealand joining these partnerships is being met with wide and open and bipartisan resistance from the “old custodians” of the country’s uniquely defined strategic independence founded on maintaining a difficult balance of power and ultimately rejects militarization and aggressive geopolitical maneuvering.
Surely considering the importance China’s economy and trade, Prime Minister Luxon is going to tread a very delicate and difficult path in deciding if its is really going to be worthy for his country to deal with the trade-offs of a possible defensive partnership, even a light one, within the Aukus framework.
No doubt that what are the trade-offs for Wellington, will turned to be, from Beijing’s perspectives, into real consequences that New Zealand will have to deal with.
As explained by Miller, the Chinese Foreign Minister might have been extremely clear in drawing some red lines while meeting his counterparts in Wellington.
Yet, no matter the apparent level of complexities in the relationships between China and New Zealand, relatively to what is unfolding these days among Tokyo, Manila and Washington, they surely appear, in the eyes of China’s officials, of minor gravity.
They see their relationships with the country as a sort of “pet project” and this might explain the positive, almost effusive tones used by China’s Ambassador in Wellington in a piece published in Global Times to highlight the resilience and the potential of the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Not the same can be said over the developments in Manila this week when American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, in an official visit, emphasized the “ironclad” nature of the bilateral relationships of the two countries.
In addition, during his visit, it was officially announced that President Biden will host on April 11 the first trilateral meeting between the USA, Japan and the Philippines.
As disappointing as this announcement might be for Beijing, it is fair assuming that it was something already widely anticipated.
After all it is obvious that these three countries are stepping up their partnership, considering not only Washington’s increased boost of its support towards Manila but also how President Marcos of Philippines has become an indispensable interlocutor for Japan in matter of defense and more.
Tokyo’s bromance with Manila is not new.
Japan’s view of the Philippines as a key partner to contain and confront China is something of a more recent phenomenon, something sparked by President Marcos’ rise to power with his tough stance against Beijing.
Japan, let’s not forget, boosts an historical cooperation with Manila, something that well precedes China’s ambitious overture around the world with its global strategic plans like the Road and Belt Initiative.
Tokyo indeed has been the biggest source of bilateral aid to Manila according the Philippines’s Department of Finance.
The new dimension in the bilateral relationship between the two nation that is emerging is a new focus on defense that is built around Tokyo’s New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific that was released exactly one year ago, on March 20.
If the progress being made on implementing this strategy that is fully aligned with Manila’s approach to region, is certainly a cause of concern for Beijing, the trilateral summit should not be seen as a surprise by China.
After all, Washington, Tokyo and Manila do share the same concerns have towards Beijing’s aggressive postures in the South China Sea.
Yet what would really worry Beijing is a possible inclusion of Manila in the QUAD partnership among India, Australia, USA and Japan.
Having the Philippines in this evolving alliance would probably cause an uproar in China, probably at much exponentially higher degree of anger and range than what could be the consequences of a possible involvement of New Zealand in the Aukus.
Yet as per now there are no prospects for Manila to join the QUAD but for sure Washington, at least if President Biden is re-elected in November, is going to put a considerable effort to re-design the existing configurations of regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific.
The relevance of ASEAN with its “crystallized ” and over venerated centrality that no external partners can, at least, formally doubt, will decrease and become meaningless unless the very improbable will happen: the emergence of some new assertive strategic positioning, something that President Marcos is wishing for.
Is there anyone who is remembering the existence of the Asia Regional Forum? I hardly think so.
Rush Doshi did a great job in his book, “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order”
He persuasively recounted the successful attempts made, over the last few decades, by China of influencing emerging regional mechanisms like the ARF.
Basically, Beijing not only managed to “neutralizing” them but also purifying them of any American geopolitical influence.
The strategy was so successful, as explained by Doshi, that these bodies became irrelevant.
Now the Americans are following the same playbook, a strategy that Doshi himself recommends.
We should expect new regional arrangements like the QUAD or the trilateral summit between Tokyo, Washington and Manila and, very possibly, multiple variations of them with some strategic overlapping of these mechanisms that, by design, are going to remain informal and loose in short term.
Even if Washington, one day, certainly not immediate from now, might be willing to push the envelope with the creation of a formal new alliance in the region, this will not be a copy and paste of an Indo Pacific version of the NATO.
Such new mechanism that would bring together the emerging and still very loose configurations that Washington is currently investing in through a step by step, wait and see approach, will surely contain different pillars beyond defense, like climate action, trade, investments and people to people diplomacy.
Broadening this alliance beyond defense is a must in terms of gaining broader acceptability in the region a way to downplay but not dilute its military dimension.
It is a long design that officials in Foggy Bottom, the headquarters of the State Department in Washington, are still figuring it out and intentionally, they might be keen to play the long game, without showing their cards.
Manila, is surely pushing for concrete developments in this direction.
The Trilateral summit, few weeks from now, will add a new piece in the puzzle that is being designed enabled by the Americans.
Canberra, even with a more cautious Labor government, might be interested to explore all options that could ensure its strategic and defensive security without alienating its partners in the region, especially ASEAN nations.
Such new alliance bound mechanism might be also very tempting for Wellington too.
Let’s not forget that its Defense Assessment “A Rough Sea can still be Navigated” dated 2021, offered a crystal clear view of concerns caused by the expansionism projected by China and by the increasingly more aggressive stances of the People Liberation Army of China in the South China Sea.
Strategic competition is surely a key concept well underlined in the more recent Defense Policy and Strategy Statement issued in 2023 by Wellington.
Pragmatism and an astute diplomacy are, so far, enabling Wellington to walk a tightrope, refraining New Zealand from assuming bolder positions more aligned with its traditional partners.
Almost ironically, many of the answers to this evolving geopolitical conundrum in the Asia Pacific, will depend on Beijing’s way of dealing with the arising challenges.
Perhaps, even within the top echelons of the officialdom in Chinese capital might start being aware that maintaining and upholding unwavering positions across the region, reflecting what many perceive as its hegemonic rise and uncompromising attitudes, might make things worse for Beijing itself and give Washington more influence in the region.
The recent news about Chinese state linked hackers penetrating the New Zealand’s parliament will certainly make policy makers in Wellington think twice on whom they are dealing with and how to forge ahead their relationships with Beijing.
The author writes about regional integration and geopolitics in the Asia Pacific.
